openclaude hit 895 stars and 421 forks in the days after the Claude Code source leak. If you are running it or considering it, here is a clear picture of what it actually is and where the real risks lie.
What openclaude is
openclaude is a fork of the leaked Anthropic Claude Code source that replaces the Claude-only backend with an OpenAI-compatible provider shim. You can run the full Claude Code toolset — bash, file read/write/edit, grep, glob, MCP, multi-agent tasks — against GPT-4o, Gemini, DeepSeek, Ollama, or any model that speaks the OpenAI chat completions API.
It is a CLI tool. You run it from the terminal the same way you run claude. There is no server, no port, no auth gateway. Configuration is entirely via environment variables:
export CLAUDE_CODE_USE_OPENAI=1
export OPENAI_BASE_URL=https://api.openai.com/v1
export OPENAI_MODEL=gpt-4o
export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...
openclaudeThe npm package is @gitlawb/openclaude and the binary is openclaude.
The actual security risks
1. It is derived from leaked Anthropic source (legal risk)
openclaude is built on ~512,000 lines of Anthropic proprietary TypeScript that leaked via a missing .npmignore on March 31 2026. Anthropic has filed DMCA takedown notices against multiple repositories, including the upstream claw-code fork and openclaude.
This is not a runtime security issue — it is a legal and supply chain risk. If @gitlawb/openclaude or openclaude-core appear in your package.json, you are shipping code under active DMCA enforcement.
npx ship-safe legal .ship-safe legal flags both packages as leaked-source derivatives.
2. Your profile file may expose API keys
openclaude stores named profiles in .openclaude-profile.json in your working directory. This file holds an env object containing whatever environment variables you configured — including OPENAI_API_KEY and OPENAI_BASE_URL.
openclaude ships with this file in its default .gitignore. The risk is if you initialize openclaude inside a repo that does not inherit that .gitignore, or if you copy the profile manually to a new project.
Check your project .gitignore includes:
.openclaude-profile.jsonship-safe audit . will flag the profile file if present, reminding you to verify it is excluded from version control.
3. Insecure provider URL
If you are running openclaude against a local or self-hosted model and set OPENAI_BASE_URL to an http:// endpoint (not localhost), all LLM traffic — your prompts, code context, and model responses — is sent over unencrypted HTTP.
# Insecure: traffic is plaintext on the network
export OPENAI_BASE_URL=http://my-server.internal/v1
# Secure: use https or limit to localhost
export OPENAI_BASE_URL=https://my-server.internal/v1
export OPENAI_BASE_URL=http://localhost:11434/v1 # Ollama local — fineship-safe checks .openclaude-profile.json and flags any non-localhost OPENAI_BASE_URL using http://.
The ToxicSkills problem
Snyk's ToxicSkills research found that 36% of AI agent skills contain security flaws, with 1,467 skills in the wild carrying active malicious payloads. The attack patterns they found include:
| Pattern | What it does |
|---|---|
| Silent curl exfiltration | Skill instructs agent to POST data to external server without showing output |
| System prompt override | Skill attempts to replace the agent's instructions mid-session |
| Credential harvesting | Skill reads `~/.npmrc`, `~/.ssh`, `~/.aws` and sends contents outbound |
| Output suppression | Skill explicitly instructs the agent not to report what it is doing |
openclaude exposes the same tool surface as Claude Code — bash, file read/write, grep. A malicious skill has the same blast radius.
Before installing any skill:
npx ship-safe scan-skill <skill-url>ship-safe scan-skill checks for all six ToxicSkills attack patterns, known malicious SHA-256 hashes, data exfiltration service domains, and permission escalation attempts.
Auditing your setup
# Check for legal risk in package.json
npx ship-safe legal .
# Full audit including agent config and profile file checks
npx ship-safe audit .
# Scan a specific skill before installing
npx ship-safe scan-skill https://example.com/skill.mdSummary
openclaude is a CLI tool, not a server. It does not bind to any port or expose a gateway. The risks are:
- Legal: DMCA-covered leaked Anthropic source
- Credential exposure:
.openclaude-profile.jsoncommitted to git - Unencrypted LLM traffic:
OPENAI_BASE_URLoverhttp://to non-localhost - Malicious skills: ToxicSkills payloads if skills are installed without vetting
Use ship-safe legal . and ship-safe audit . to check all of these automatically.